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Abstract
This study examines two inter-connected issues: the local economic governance strategies pursued by
English local authorities in the post-2007 Crisis austerity period, and the impact of these strategies on local
work and employment conditions. The study draws on interview data, policy documents and statistical
datasets from an analysis of two English localities to understand how local authorities responded to the
economic pressures resulting from the 2007 Crisis and subsequent imposition of austerity policies. The
study finds local authorities engaged in various forms of entrepreneurial and austerity urbanist policies
under conditions of tight budgetary constraints, resulting in an increased role for the private sector as a
vehicle to generate jobs and increase tax revenue. This process has increased the influence of private
sector actors within local government, part of a longer term trend. This study presents evidence to
illustrate why this scenario is problematic for improving work and employment conditions, chiefly due to
an unwillingness to progressively regulate work, and a prioritising of job quantity in terms of total
employment, rather than favouring the creation of sustainable, high-quality local employment.
Keywords
local economic governance strategies, local government, labour markets, work and employment,
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Introduction
The aim of this study is to examine how local
economic governance strategies (LEGS) im-
plemented by English local authorities in the
post-crisis austerity period have impacted local
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work and employment conditions. The study
presents findings from a comparative study of
two English localities – Greater Manchester,
and the D2N2 (Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham
and Nottinghamshire) region – to achieve this
research aim. It is important to understand and
examine LEGS and their impact on work and
employment conditions for several reasons.
Firstly, the impact of the 2007–2008 Financial
Crisis is still having adverse effects on UK
labour markets and this is acutely evident at the
local level. Local authorities in the United
Kingdom have undergone profound shifts in
economic governance since the Crisis and
subsequent imposition of austerity policies by
central government (Townsend and Champion,
2014), and despite recent claims from the UK
government that austerity policies have ended
(HM Government, 2020), the impact of such
policies remains. Local authorities have had to
implement budgetary cuts averaging 33% to
public services with detrimental consequences
for citizens and workers (Gray and Barford,
2018). England has been the worst affected
nation within the United Kingdom in terms of
budgetary cuts, and city-regions have faced
significant cuts to expenditure in comparison to
other areas, experiencing 74% of total gov-
ernment cuts (Centre for Cities, 2019: 14).
Local authorities must manage the fallout from
the crisis and imposition of austerity policies as
they administer, manage and plan local services
going forward over the financial cycle. The
impact of austerity has been to reduce the
amount of funding to local authorities via central
government provisions of resource-equalising
and needs-assessed grants (Jackson, 2017).
Budgetary cuts make it challenging for local
authorities to maintain high-quality provision of
core and statutorily required functions of pro-
viding essential services such as health and social
care, educational provision and infrastructure
maintenance. Local authorities have had even
fewer resources to devote to non-essential, but
still important, issues such as labour market
interventions and training provision as a result.
Secondly, the Crisis exacerbated existing labour
market weaknesses in the United Kingdom.
Work and employment in the United Kingdom is
characterised by high incidences of low-paid
employment and stagnant real wages (TUC,
2019; Yates, 2017), increasing skills- and time-
based under-employment (Bell and Blanchflower,
2018), limited training provisions and skills
development (Lloyd and Payne, 2016) and work
intensification (Gallie et al., 2017). These trends
are responsible for a declining wage share for
labour (OECD, 2015) and heightened economic
inequality (Haldane, 2019), and it is within these
economic conditions that local authorities must
endeavour to maintain existing services and,
crucially, promote local economic growth.
The impact of the crisis on local authorities
and on work and employment outcomes in-
tersects and manifests in the form of LEGS.
The concept of LEGS captures all of the ac-
tivities developed within a locality that con-
tribute to shaping the governance of a local
economy, ranging from prevailing thought
processes to specific policies and legislative
actions (Tomaney et al., 2010). Written docu-
mentation, reports, speeches and other forms of
communication formalize LEGS in the sub-
stantive actions of institutions and individuals
(Fuller, 2017). The results of LEGS are evident
in local economic and local labour market
conditions; LEGS can lead to improvements in
labour market outcomes; conversely LEGS can
sustain or even exacerbate problematic local
economic and labour market conditions, for
example, increased levels of unemployment or
low-paying work. Therein, LEGS developed
and, pursued by local authorities, are a central
pillar in attempts to encourage economic
growth and social reproduction. An analytical
focus on LEGS grounds seemingly abstract
processes of capital flows and fiscal austerity by
concretising them in an empirical analysis of
local authority behaviour, specifically in this
case the influence of LEGS on local work and
employment conditions.
Two research questions guided the research;
firstly, what are the similarities and differences
between the LEGS pursued by local authorities
116 Local Economy 36(2)
in the Greater Manchester and the D2N2
(Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Notting-
hamshire) region? This question seeks to un-
derstand what aspects of LEGS are successful
in responding to economic crises and ensuring
sustainable local economic development.
Secondly, how do LEGS affect local work and
employment conditions for local workers? This
question seeks to provide empirical evidence to
support the findings to question one by inter-
rogating how LEGS have impacted work and
employment outcomes in both localities. In
order to explore the labour market outcomes of
LEGS and answer the research questions, the
study is divided into four sections. “LEGS and
the decline in job quality in the United King-
dom” present our theorization, its historical
context, and outline our methodology and re-
search design. “Developing LEGS in Greater
Manchester and D2N2” presents evidence on
the contemporary economic governance strate-
gies of Greater Manchester and the D2N2 re-
gion. “Labour market outcomes” probe the local
labour market outcomes of LEGS in both lo-
calities and “Discussion: Differences and simi-
larities in the two regions?” offers an analysis,
discussion and conclusion on the empirical
findings in the context of our research questions.
LEGS and the decline in job
quality in the United Kingdom
This section constructs a systematic framework
for understanding the behaviour of local au-
thorities, drawing on central concepts from
political economy, chiefly: the state, social class
and capital accumulation. This framework is
then used to evaluate historical developments
in Greater Manchester and the D2N2 region.
The local state and LEGS
Understanding how LEGS affect labour market
outcomes requires a theorisation of the state
that interrogates the expression of centralized
state power in a particular locality. The concept
of the local state situates local authorities and
their behaviour historically within the wider
processes of continuous capitalist production
and social reproduction, rather than being re-
ified and ‘read-off’ in an ahistorical manner
(Yates and Clark, 2018). What constitutes the
composition of the local state is – at a high level
of abstraction – conflict between classes with
fundamentally competingmaterial interests. Like
the institutions of the central state, local state
actors and institutions crystallise social and class
conflict at a particular moment in time (Clarke,
1989). Local economic governance strategies, for
example, and the institutional relationship they
have to local labour market outcomes ground
competing class interests between capital and
labour and express these concretely in the rela-
tions between individual private employers and
workers. Conflict between these groups plays out
through the social form of the local state that is
necessarily open-ended and precludes determin-
istic predictions of local economic development
or labour market outcomes.
The abstraction of the local state becomes
empirically concretised in local state institu-
tions and individual agents who direct and
engage in LEGS. Within the institutional in-
frastructure of the local state, these actors are
immediately responsible for responding to the
dynamic and often contradictory outcomes of
capitalist accumulation in their localities. For
example, within localities there are ever-
present tensions between tempering the
movement of capital by regulation or allowing
the free flow of capital. Similar tensions exist
between acting in the interests of capital-in-
general, or favouring specific individual capi-
tals and thereby facilitating local state capture.
There are also tensions between disciplining or
cooperating with labour, promoting territorial
specialisation via locally enacted regulation
and allowing uncoordinated growth via de-
regulation (Gough, 2002). Local state actors
must endeavour to manage these contradictions
by pursuing broadly neoliberal, social demo-
cratic or radical strategies in order to maintain
the production–reproduction nexus of a locality
(Gough, 2002).
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Neoliberal resolutions favour empowering
private capital through lightening product
market and labour market regulations, and
through the exclusion of labour from decision-
making power as part of a more generalised
suppression of labour. Social democratic
strategies, by contrast, favour attempts to co-
ordinate capitalist accumulation and incorpo-
rate labour into decision-making processes with
the aim of increasing labour productivity and
the profitability of firms. Both neoliberal and
social democratic strategies operate within a
capitalist framework and all localities that
pursue them are vulnerable to recurrent capi-
talist crisis, irrespective of how seemingly re-
silient a particular LEGS may appear to be.
Radical LEGS, by contrast, seek to overcome
the contradictions of capitalism by pursuing
processes of de-commodification and de-
marketisation that diminish capitalist impera-
tives within a locality. Radical strategies can
involve (re)municipalisation, promotion of
worker co-operatives, development of local
currencies, progressive taxation and proactive
local opposition to national policies (Latham,
2017). Historically, however, radical LEGS
face the seemingly intractable contradiction of
having to organise in and against capitalist
markets (Nolan and O’Donnell, 1987).
The limited statutory powers that local au-
thorities possess limit their ability to define
their own environment and engage in proactive
intervention in local economies. The UK’s
highly centralised system of government
heavily constrains local authorities by limiting
their fiscal autonomy, meaning they cannot
meaningfully affect local tax rates or substan-
tively shape how tax revenues are spent
(Hooghe et al., 2010). Despite the narrow range
of options available to local authorities, there
are significant variations in LEGS and England
(and the UK), suggesting the presence of some
relative autonomy from the central state. There
has also been increased optimism among local
politicians and state officials that localities may
be able to exert greater autonomy following the
2011 Localism Act and the associated increase
in support for devolution in some English
regions.
What is also important is the manner in
which funding for local government declined at
a time when deindustrialisation led to increased
unemployment levels across English cities.
From the 1970s onwards, local authorities –
faced with economic pressures and declining
funding – had to turn towards the private sector
in an attempt to ensure continued local social
reproduction. This shift towards entrepreneur-
ial urbanism (Harvey, 1989) saw local state
institutions and actors actively promote private
sector-led economic growth in an attempt to
create jobs and increase local tax revenues. It is
significant that in the latest manifestation of this
strategy in the United Kingdom, a combination
of economic downturn since 2007, budget cuts
due to austerity and the greater role of private
capital each increase the risk of these economic
strategies becoming locked-in, resulting in ‘aus-
terity urbanism’ becoming permanent (Aldag
et al., 2019; Davies and Blanco, 2017; Peck,
2012, 2014a, 2014b). This scenario is prob-
lematic as evidence presented in this article
suggests these entrepreneurial policies are un-
able to generate decent labour market out-
comes and may be contributing to increasing
levels of low-paid work and economic
inequality.
Neoliberalism and the erosion of
decent work
Broader shifts in the political economy of mac-
roeconomic management in the United Kingdom
have compelled local authorities to look for al-
ternative solutions to persistent problems in their
localities. In the post-war period, the United
Kingdom was characterised by buoyant eco-
nomic conditions evident at the local level
through the diffusion of ‘spatial Keynesianism’
(Martin and Sunley, 1997) resulting in generous
public spending across localities, and invest-
ment in infrastructure and job creation, partic-
ularly in the public sector (Brenner, 2004). This
system involved Keynesian state intervention
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to deliver sustained economic growth and im-
proved welfare provision that balanced a
commitment to the market economy with in-
tervention to promote full-employment and
social welfare (Harvey, 2007). The political
compromise between capital-labour took the
form of capital controls, nationalization, a
commitment to the welfare state and trade union
representation. However, economic growth up
until the 1960s obscured long-run relative
economic decline (Gamble, 1994). Neoliberal
policies grew in popularity form the 1970s
onwards with the ostensible aim of reversing
economic decline and restoring the profitability
of British-based capital. These were charac-
terised by anti-inflation, balanced budgets, re-
ducing union militancy and curtailing the drag
effects on the market of welfare expenditure and
state monopolies (Karakilic and Clark, 2020). A
sterling crisis in 1976 followed by increases in
industrial action-led successive Conservative
governments (1979–1997) to focus on financial
de-regulation and privatization in order to shift
the balance of the economy frommanufacturing
to financial services (Crouch, 2011; Harvey,
2007: 19–30). Neoliberalism undermined post-
war alliances between the state, managerial elites
and organised labour. What emerged was a
sustained attempt by the British state to break
organised labour in order to facilitate its re-
commodification so as to increase the profit-
ability of UK-based capital (Cox and Nilsen,
2014: 141–147). In order to achieve this aim,
a commitment to maintaining full-employment
by the state was abandoned in favour of inflation
targeting, leading to rapid rises in unemploy-
ment. These attacks on labour were accompanied
by the imposition severe restrictions on trade
unions’ ability to organise, and the material
position of organised labour was worsened fur-
ther by cuts to both welfare state and local
government spending (Glyn, 2007: 27–31).
In the workplace, neoliberal policies mani-
fest as a generalised opposition to regulatory
practices which empower labour (Nolan, 2018:
1–2). Neoliberalism similarly emphasises public
choice theory to promote worker lifestyle
preferences and the benefits of flexible em-
ployment and labour markets while simulta-
neously degrading the notion for worker voice
(Bales et al., 2018: 50; Moore et al., 2018: 404).
The ideology of this approach informs a policy
formulation in neoliberalism that views labour
markets not as social constructs but as mech-
anisms to prioritise individualised worker
choice. This formulation necessarily ignores
the constraints and associated inequalities
embedded in social class, gender, migration
status and age (Grimshaw et al., 2017: 3).
Similarly, it brushes over a permissiveness in
the regulation and enforcement of uncertain
and precarious work that is the antithesis of
decent work (Heyes et al., 2018). Further, still
neoliberalism ignores the potential for state
intervention to create the conditions that sup-
port precarious work, rather than mitigating its
presence. For example, welfare conditionality
places people under pressure to accept low-
quality jobs often characterised by low pay,
under-utilisation of skills and limited oppor-
tunities for career progression and development
(Briken and Taylor, 2018; Greer, 2016). Na-
tional Minimum and Living Wage legislation
provides a floor to wage exploitation in low-
quality jobs, and in-work tax credits provide
some material relief for low-paid workers. This
type of work is however blighted by problems
of wage theft and non-compliance with various
elements of employment law (Gardiner, 2015;
Hammer and Plugor, 2019).
These characteristics of contemporary work
highlight the extent to which employers – ac-
tively supported by the state at the local and
national level – are no longer willing to make
continuous reciprocal commitments to workers
that would underpin a decent work agenda
(Collier, 2018: 42–46).
Historical developments in Greater
Manchester and the D2N2 region
The emergence of entrepreneurial urbanism as
a dominant feature of LEGS illustrates the ten-
sion between the necessity for local authorities
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production within a locality and the limited
strategic choice that arises from restrictions
imposed by central government. This devel-
opment did not occur in isolation; rather, it
connects to broader changes in the sectoral and
occupational composition of local labour
markets in the United Kingdom. For example,
in those cities that developed historically be-
cause of mass employment in the manufacturing
sector employment was characterised by per-
manent, open-ended jobs that were well-paid
and offered opportunities for career progres-
sion within internal labour markets (McGovern
et al., 2007). The 1970s economic crisis
accelerated the decline of manufacturing as a
major employer in the United Kingdom with
significant consequences for cities built on
manufacturing, such as Greater Manchester,
Derby and Nottingham. In 1951, manufacturing
accounted for 53% of all employment in Greater
Manchester, declining to 41% in 1971 and
<10% as of 2019. Similarly, manufacturing
and extractive industries accounted for around
two-thirds of all employment in the East
Midlands in 1963 and much of this was con-
centrated in the industrial and mining complex
of Nottinghamshire–Derbyshire. Employment
in these sectors accounts for around 11% of total
employment in D2N2 as of 2019 (EMEPC,
1966: 31; GB Historical, 2017). By the 1980s
English urban localities experienced severe
negative consequences following on from de-
industrialisation and associated structural un-
employment, chiefly chronic poverty, increased
crime and worsening physical andmental health
(Peck and Ward, 2002).
The emergence of the service sector as a
major employer from the 1990s onwards ap-
peared to offset the decline in manufacturing
employment. Jobs in sectors such as retail,
hospitality, personal and care services and
business and financial services did – in a
quantitative sense – replace many of the jobs
lost in manufacturing (Harding et al., 2010).
The quality of these jobs was – and remains –
variable (as detailed in Labour market
outcomes). Compositional shifts in local labour
markets were guided by urban development
corporations (UDCs), which were run by
central government and designed to re-
invigorate local economies affected by dein-
dustrialisation (Deas et al., 2000). Training and
enterprise councils (TECs) complemented
UDCs and played a role in the governance of
local economies by acting as a site where in-
dividuals from the public and private sectors
could coalesce and develop local economic
strategy. In the 1990s, Greater Manchester saw
the emergence of ‘grant coalitions’ that aimed
to capture national and EU-level funding. The
coalitions fostered very close workings be-
tween small numbers of elite ‘Manchester Men’
from local politics and business through the
Manchester TEC and related bodies (Cochrane
et al., 1996; Tickell and Peck, 1996). Grant
coalitions developed into growth coalitions that
now actively pursue a private sector-led growth
strategy growth in Greater Manchester.
In the D2N2 region, by contrast, there was
not the same level of development coalition and
institution building, in part because of the
heterogeneous nature of the region and the
complexity of its local government structures.
The D2N2 area has unitary local authorities in
Derby and Nottingham alongside two-tier
(county/district) local government in the rest
of the two shires. What compounds this
structural complexity is the political make-up
of local authorities within the region, for ex-
ample, Nottingham city is an embedded Labour
stronghold. In contrast, Derby City Council has
been under ‘no overall control’ in recent years,
whereas both Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire
County Councils have moved between Labour
and Conservative administrations over recent
electoral cycles. Also significant is that the
D2N2 borders were not formalised until 2011,
when they came into being with the estab-
lishing of the D2N2 Local Enterprise Part-
nership (LEP). Prior to the establishment of the
D2N2 LEP, a ‘Three Cities Initiative’ launched
by Derby, Leicester and Nottingham operated
within the auspices of the East Midlands
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Development Agency, 2006. In the mid-2000s,
this initiative sought to capture national grants
for local development and promote a coordi-
nated and collaborative approach to develop-
ment, although it did not have the same
successes as in Greater Manchester due to lack
of private sector buy-in and the complexities of
local politics, which were often characterised
by inter-city rivalry. A concurrent process
during this period was the attempt by local
planners to re-orientate parts of the D2N2 re-
gion away from a reliance on manufacturing
and towards services. In Nottingham, ‘public
entrepreneurs’ played an important role in di-
recting local economic growth (Rossiter and
Smith, 2017). These individual stakeholders
assisted the economic development of Not-
tingham by securing institutional resources to
effect change and promote development. The
most obvious recent manifestation of this ac-
tivity was the creation in 2003 of the Bio City
life science business incubation and grow-on
facility that is now the largest complex of this
type in the United Kingdom (Smith et al.,
2017).
Two developments are especially relevant
for understanding LEGS and associated local
labour market outcomes in the aftermath of the
2007 Crisis. The first is the creation of 39 LEPs
in England in 2011, and the second is the
current funding landscape for local authorities.
Local Enterprise Partnerships are non-statutory
bodies established to assist in the governance of
localities and foreground private sector influ-
ence. The National Audit Office (NAO) has
been critical of LEPs, specifically on funding
and accountability issues (NAO, 2016), leading
to the publication of the Ney Review in 2017
(2017). This review was followed by subse-
quent reports and enquires which highlighted
governance failings within LEPS (DHCLG,
2018; NAO, 2016, 2019). Criticism of LEP
funding relates to broader changes in the
funding landscape for local authorities. Therein
in addition to a reduction of funding following
on from the diffusion of austerity policies, there
has also been a shift away from formula-based
allocations and a move towards challenge-
based funds. These two processes link to
LEPs, which in turn act as strategic institu-
tions that bid for challenge-based funding in
the post-crisis period (Taylor, 2019). Awards
of challenge-based funds centre on the use of
funding to further private sector job creation.
Greater Manchester has been more successful
than the D2N2 region in this process, due in
part to its well-established network of insti-
tutional actors that give it greater strategic
capacities (detailed in Developing LEGS in
Greater Manchester and D2N2). The re-
mainder of this study examines precisely how
localities pursue LEGS in a changed funding
landscape and the implications for local la-
bour market outcomes.
Methodology and research design
The research utilised a comparative qualitative
approach to interrogate similarities and dif-
ferences in LEGS and the impact these have on
work and employment outcomes. Recent re-
search by Peck (2017) highlights the method-
ological importance of interrogating global
processes of capitalist accumulation by con-
ducting detailed comparative case studies
grounded at a local level. A comparative ap-
proach allows for the articulation of abstract
concepts by grounding them in empirical study,
and it facilitates the generation of new theo-
retical insights that illuminate often stale no-
tions of neoliberalism. Greater Manchester and
the D2N2 region have a shared history of de-
industrialisation and economic renewal through
the growth of employment in the service sector,
making them suitable cases for comparison.
Central government lauds Greater Manchester
as an example of a city-region that has success-
fully overcome the decline of its manufacturing
sector to re-invent itself as a centre for service
sector employment. The culmination of Greater
Manchester’s renewal is the devolution of
powers to the city-region via the 2011 Devo-
lution Agreement, which grants greater auton-
omy over spending decisions (HM Treasury,
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2014). The D2N2 region shares similarities
with Greater Manchester in that it has devel-
oped a service economy while retaining a
manufacturing presence in parts of the region.
Manufacturing as a percentage of total em-
ployment is 14.3%, compared with 8.2% in
Greater Manchester. Gross value added growth
rates, moreover, are consistently lower in
D2N2 than Greater Manchester, illustrating a
weakness of the predominantly service sector
economy of the region.
How LEGS in both localities affect growth
outcomes, and to what extent economic growth
is of itself sufficient for the development of
sustainable local labour markets with the ca-
pacity to generate decent work for local resi-
dents, is a critical research issue. In order to
answer the two research questions, this article
poses draws upon primary data from forty
semi-structured interviews with local politi-
cians and state officials, local employers and
labour market actors in both localities con-
ducted over the period 2016–2019. The re-
search also makes use of extensive secondary
data in the form of local policy documents,
economic reports and labour market statistical
datasets.
Developing LEGS in Greater
Manchester and D2N2
Greater Manchester
Greater Manchester has since the early 2000s
pursued a specific LEGS that aims to generate
economic growth driven by labour market re-
form (AGMA, 2009, 2013). The underlying
principle of Greater Manchester’s strategy is
that is that any growth is better than stagnation,
and that the varied – and often detrimental
outcomes – of growth can be resolved at a
future date (Yates and Clark, 2018). The As-
sociation of Greater Manchester Authorities
(AGMA), established following the dissolution
of Greater Manchester County Council in 1984,
pursued a process of ‘engag[ing] and follow
[ing]’ the private sector (AGMA, 2013),
establishing the Manchester Growth Company
(MGC) in 1989 to facilitate more coordinated
interventions in the local economy. The MGC:
conducts research, acts to attract inward FDI,
promotes skills development and job creation,
provides business support (such as legal and
administrative assistance) and runs marketing
campaigns (MGC, 2019). In 2011, AGMA
formed the Greater Manchester Combined
Authority (GMCA), to bring the region’s 10
local authorities together as one.
Greater Manchester’s strategy has relied
heavily on, ‘co-opting in a non-executive
fashion’, private sector business leaders in
order to shape local economic governance
(former Head of Strategy, GM Economic De-
velopment Agency). A key mechanism for
facilitating the input of private sector leaders is
the Greater Manchester Local Enterprise
Partnership (GMLEP), which ‘sits at the heart
of all decision-making in the city’ (GMLEP,
2018). The extant literature and its associated
research illustrate the success of GMLEP rel-
ative to other LEPs in England in achieving
favourable economic growth outcomes (Taylor,
2019), chiefly by securing the aforementioned
resources associated with challenge-based
funds from central government which have
boosted private sector job growth. The com-
position of the GMLEP reflects the influence of
private sector actors in Greater Manchester and
in turn reflects the economic growth strategy of
the city and the associated local labour market
outcomes this growth generates. The GMLEP
Board comprises of 15 individuals; 11 are
drawn from the private and voluntary sectors
(including the Chair of GMLEP) and the re-
maining four are elected individuals from the
public sector. The uneven ratio of public to
private individuals has become more pro-
nounced since GMLEPs inception in 2011, and
there are no representatives of organised labour
on the GMLEP.
The promotion and development of sectoral
clusters – a strategy borne out of agglomera-
tion theory – is a core feature of Greater
Manchester’s LEGS (McCann and Van Oort,
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2019). Headline local growth sectors include
biotechnology, the creative and digital sector,
financial and professional services and ad-
vanced manufacturing (Holman, 2013: 94).
These sectors are favoured by planners as are
high value-added and are a source of inward
FDI (Manchester Inward Development Agency
Service, 2016). ‘Greater Manchester’ is a co-
herent economic region and political entity brand
that is promotable to businesses and investors,
both nationally and internationally where pro-
motion activities are assisted by the global vis-
ibility of the city’s sports teams and universities
(Head of economic strategy, a Greater Man-
chester university). One aim of Greater Man-
chester’s LEGS is to advance locally based
production of both goods and services higher-up
in global value chains, thereby potentially gen-
erating higher rates of profitability for firms.
Labour market outcomes details the limits of this
strategy, illustrating how – despite the best in-
tentions of local planners – this strategy fails to
benefit all workers, as low-paying employment
continues to grow.
The D2N2 region
The D2N2 area is a fractious, polycentric
spatial region comprised of two cities and
numerous small towns surrounded by rural
hinterlands. The governance arrangements for
D2N2 are complex; there are 18 local author-
ities in total, both unitary and two-tier. The
embeddedness of working relationships in
D2N2 is shallow because of the short-time
period in which the authorities have worked
together and because of the limited resources
available to develop LEGS in the region, in
contrast to the embeddedness of Greater
Manchester as a spatially coherent entity. Key
stakeholders in the Nottinghamshire and Der-
byshire Chamber of Commerce were heavily
influential in the formation of the D2N2LEP
border and successfully lobbied for it to match
its own operational borders (Former local eco-
nomic development agency planner, 2019).
When D2N2LEP was established, it was hosted
and provided space by the Chamber, and the
Chamber employed its first member of staff.
Both of these points illustrate the degree to which
the non-statutory, voluntary institutional form of
LEPs makes them prone to takeover or ‘capture’
by specific private sector interests. The actions of
a small number of interests continue to shape the
emergence of entrepreneurial urbanism as a
dominant feature of LEGS. D2N2LEP remains a
voluntary association and as such is heavily
dependent on one of its constituent local au-
thorities, Derbyshire County Council, to act as its
‘accountable body’ when in receipt of public
funds (D2N2LEP website, 2019).
Local economic governance strategies in
the D2N2 region focus on economic devel-
opment and labour market improvement with
the aim of increasing the productivity of local
firms and workers (D2N2LEP, 2013, 2017).
The D2N2LEP facilitates these aims by shap-
ing and providing funding, supporting private
sector actors to invest locally for the long-term
and fostering the implementation of the D2N2
Local Industrial Strategy (D2N2LEP, 2017).
Planning documents also indicate the necessity
of ‘inclusive’ economic growth (Black et al.,
2017) that aims to foster the creation of quality
jobs, raise wages and increase skills levels
(D2N2LEP, 2013). The D2N2 Growth Hub
supports these aims and acts as a business in-
cubator, offering technical support, as well as
financial aid, and skill and employability
training. Extant research, however, reveals that
LEP Growth Hubs are often limited to sign-
posting businesses to information and re-
sources, with little substantive capacity to assist
businesses (Payne, 2018). Evidence from the
D2N2LEP suggests that its Growth Hub is
similar; the D2N2LEP has limited internal
staffing and therefore limited capacity to de-
liver projects and programmes. It is therefore
reliant on other local organisations such as the
three local universities to deliver many of its
projects and programmes.
The D2N2 region has developed two en-
terprise zones designed to bring local busi-
nesses together with the aim of securing the
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spatial benefits of agglomeration. The decision
to locate the first of these zones on the Beeston
Boots site is thought to have been heavily
influenced by the then Boots CEO (Interview,
former local planner, 2019), again illustrating
the ability of influential individual private
capitals to shape or capture the direction of
policy. Place branding is also evident in the
D2N2 strategy, and this is however limited to
the creation of the ‘D2N2 – The UK’s Most
Inspirational Postcode’ slogan which featured
prominently in their first growth strategy
(D2N2LEP, 2013). D2N2’s economic strate-
gies contain common hallmarks of entrepre-
neurial urbanism such as local boosterism and
the promotion of specific sectors of the private
sector to generate jobs growth. Therein the
benefits of agglomeration are projected, as is
greater private sector influence over the gov-
ernance of the local economy, illustrated by the
central role of the D2N2LEP (D2N2, 2013,
2017).
The D2N2LEP has become a central insti-
tution for local economic governance in the
D2N2 region as local leaders have declared
attempts to achieve mayoral devolution ‘dead’
(Metcalf, 2016). A proposal for greater met-
ropolitan cooperation across the D2N2 region
as an alternative to devolution is outlined in the
Vision 2030 Strategy document and has now
resulted in the publication of a ‘Metro Strategy’
for Derby and Nottingham (Derby and
Nottingham City Councils, 2017). This ap-
proach is, however, always at risk from local
actor political conflict within the D2N2 region.
In 2009, for example, the newly elected leader
of Nottinghamshire County Council (NCC)
withdrew support for the expansion of the local
tram infrastructure project, which the previous
administration had supported, citing concerns
over the impact on road users, local businesses
and the environment, as well as cost issues and
potentially unfair distribution of benefits of the
project (NCC, 2009: 3–5). This withdrawal is
an example of a broader negative tendency of
LEGS, wherein a change in local government
and a subsequent shift in the local interest
groups which are favoured plays out against a
backdrop of declining material support and
financial resources. This tendency is an illus-
tration of how enforced neoliberal competition
supersedes social democratic cooperation, un-
dermining opportunities for regional growth
and cooperation (Nurse and Fulton, 2017).
Labour market outcomes of this article now
examine precisely how LEGS in Greater
Manchester and the D2N2 region have im-
pacted work and employment conditions.
Labour market outcomes
Greater Manchester
Greater Manchester has sustained employment
growth since the 2007 Crisis and subsequent
recession. The percentage of economically
active individuals in employment was 72.8% in
December 2018, rising from a low of 66% in
March 2012 (ONS, 2019). This headline figure
of economic growth masks several key issues.
Firstly, although employment has increased, its
quality is variable. In Greater Manchester, non-
standard forms of employment have grown
substantially since 2010; self-employment has
grown by 32%, flexible employment by 23%
and part-time employment by 12% (New
Economy, 2016: 18). Secondly, employment
in low-paying sectors increased from 35% of
total employment in 2000, to 40% by 2014
(2016: 5). Thirdly, average earnings in Greater
Manchester –measured in terms of gross weekly
pay and hourly pay excluding overtime – are
lower than in the D2N2 region and lower than
the English average too (see Table 1 for specific
figures). Fourthly, GreaterManchester continues
to trail the English average for employment
in standard occupational classifications (SOC)
1–3,1 and has above-average levels of em-
ployment in lower occupational groups. The
growth of employment in SOC 1–3 has grown
faster in Greater Manchester than the English
average over the last 16 years, and there have
been larger falls in employment in lower oc-
cupational groups (see Table 2). These findings
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suggest there is scope for the city-region’s local
labour market to potentially generate a greater
proportion of higher quality managerial and
skilled professional jobs in the future, although
more interrogation of the nature of work in these
occupations is required to their quality. In the
meantime, the continued existence of low quality
jobs in the city-region derive from the continued
growth of low-paying, low-productivity sectors,
the growth of which is problematic because
of the increased likelihood of in-work poverty
and the generally low likelihood of decent work
outcomes. The low-wage employer business
model is itself problematic; it frequently relies on
the generation of absolute, rather than relative,
surplus through intensifying or extending the
working day, rather than innovating production.
The growth of low-wage employment in Greater
Manchester is a consequence of LEGS that have
prioritised growth at any cost and have viewed
detrimental labour market outcomes as second-
ary (Former head of strategy, GM local economic
development agency).
Local planners have responded to labour
market weaknesses with a series of supply-side
policy interventions. Since 2009 a series of
locally based active labour market programmes
have been introduced to increase employment
in jobs at the lower end of the labour market via
upskilling and jobs coaching programmes. One
feature of these programmes is the way they
mimic national policy to emphasise welfare
conditionality, compelling workers to take any
job available to them, where the programme is
driven by the slogan of ‘get a job, get a better job,
get a career’ (Interview, GM DWP Manager).
Table 1. Key features of Greater Manchester and D2N2 regional economies and labour markets (2020).
Greater Manchester D2N2 region England
Total population 2,798,800 2,196,100 55,619,400
16-64 population (% total population) 1,786,200 (62.9) 1,381,600 (63.8) 34,928,983 (62.8)
Economically active (% total 16–64 population) 1,392,900 (76.4) 1,096,100 (77.1) 43,772,467 (78.7)
% workless households 17.4 16.8 14
% workforce with no qualifications 9.6 8.6 7.6
Earnings by place of work – gross weekly pay 521.6 526.3 574.9
Earnings by place of work – hourly pay ex.
Overtime
13.30 13.18 14.41
GVA per hour worked as a percentage of
England’s level (2015) (%)
87.9 85.4 100
Source: ONS Population estimates; ONS annual population survey; ONS annual survey of hours and earnings – resident and
workplace analysis; authors’ own calculations.
Table 2. Change in occupational composition of Greater Manchester and D2N2 Region 2004–2020.
Greater Manchester D2N2 region England
SOC 2004 2014 2020
% change
04-20 2004 2014 2020
% change
04-20 2004 2014 2020
% change
04-20
1–3 36.6 41.2 47.6 +11 36.6 39.9 45.3 +8.7 40.3 44.9 50.7 +10.4
4–5 25.4 21.1 19.5 5.9 24.7 23.0 19.8 4.9 25.0 21.3 19.2 5.8
6–7 17.6 19.4 16.8 0.8 16.3 17.3 16.8 +0.5 16.1 16.9 15.4 0.7
8–9 20.5 18.2 16.1 4.4 22.4 19.7 18.0 4.4 18.6 17.0 14.6 4
Source: ONS Annual Population Survey; authors’ own calculations.
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Another feature of work programmes is their
employer-led nature; Greater Manchester has
piloted the Employer Ownership of Skills pro-
gramme, which aims to ‘orientat[e] entire sectors
of the economy towards an employer-led skills
model’ (New Economy, 2015: 5).
The creation of a directly elected mayoral
position in Greater Manchester has sparked
institutional change leading to new interven-
tions in labour markets. The most prominent
example of this type of development is a Good
Employment Charter (GMCA, 2018). The term
‘Charter’ is however, a misnomer; rather, it is a
toolkit for local employers that aim to improve
local working practices. The GMCA has no
statutory powers to enforce labour market
regulation of its voluntary Charter, meaning
that in order to achieve high levels of employer
engagement with the Charter GMCA cannot
suggest any employment practices or business
strategies or business strategies which deviate
radically from prevailing norms. This strategy
of voluntary compliance may prove challeng-
ing in an economy characterised by an abun-
dance of private sector SMEs which operate a
low-wage business model.
The D2N2 region
Employment growth has occurred post-
recession in the D2N2 region; the percentage
of economically active individuals in em-
ployment was 73.6% in December 2018,
compared to 68.4% in September 2011, which
was the lowest level recorded during the re-
cession in the D2N2 region. As in Greater
Manchester, this growth in employment is of
variable quality. Around 30% of those in work
in the D2N2 region earned less than the living
wage, while nationally the figure is 25% (Black
et al., 2017). Moreover, despite higher rates of
employment in manufacturing in the D2N2
region than Greater Manchester, local labour
markets remain characterised by high levels of
employment in typically low-paying sectors
such as administration and support services
(10.2% of total employment) and retail and
wholesale (15.4% of total employment).
Growth in these sectors derives from local
planners favouring private sector job creation, a
strategy that is itself driven by the changed
nature of funding streams in the post-crisis
austerity funding landscape. Employment in
SOC groups 1–3 in the D2N2 region is both
lower than the English average, and 2.3% lower
than in Greater Manchester. Growth in SOC 1–
3 occupations has been slower than in Greater
Manchester (+8.7% to +11% over 16 years) and
the D2N2 region has actually seen a small rise
in employment in SOC 6–7 occupations of
0.5%, compared with falls of 0.8% in Greater
Manchester and 0.7% in England. There is also
the problem of limited availability of funding
tending to homogenise LEGS because central
government dictate the eligibility criteria for
most funding. This weakness makes it even
harder to generate bottom-up strategies that
genuinely respond to local need, thereby fur-
ther strengthening the structural power of pri-
vate capital locally.
Local planners in the D2N2 region have
made a public commitment to generating de-
cent work outcomes through the ‘inclusive
growth agenda’ (D2N2, 2017), alongside the
commitment to becoming a ‘slave free city’ in
the city of Nottingham (Salvation Army, 2019).
Actively promoting decent work practices via
local council tendering, compliance practices,
and through working with local think tanks and
universities to research and develop policies,
aim to embed these practices in the local po-
litical economy. As of 2019, the inclusive
growth agenda has produced no discernible
material outcomes of benefit to workers and the
slave free city campaign, altthough laudable, is
a relatively low benchmark to aim for, in
particular when assessed against other features
of a decent work agenda. These labour market
aims – like Greater Manchester’s Good Em-
ployment Charter – run the risk of failure due to
their voluntary nature and because of the lack of
statutory powers to support their advancement.
One policy tool where the D2N2 region is
ahead ofGreaterManchester is in experimentation
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with direct labour market interventions. In the
D2N2 region, there have been attempts at lo-
calised Keynesianism that aim to generate good
jobs and decent work for local workers. In 2011,
construction began on the expansion of Not-
tingham Express Transit tram system, funded by
a £578 million Private Finance Initiative, with
money coming from central government and
local councils in the D2N2 region. The aim of the
project was to expand the local tram network and
contained a commitment to maximise the local
economic benefits afforded by the scheme. This
commitment was integral to the procurement
approach adopted by Nottingham City Council
as the scheme’s promoter. The promotion of
employment and training opportunities for
young people were prioritized in order to offset
the historically high levels of youth unemploy-
ment that were prevalent in the aftermath of the
2007 Crisis. At its peak, the project employed
more than 1600 construction workers, with al-
most 400 new entrants to the labour market
finding work on the scheme, and over 700 young
people benefitting from linked work experience.
Additionally, estimates suggest that supply chain
expenditures have generated around £140m of
activity in the local economy and a further £77m
in the regional economy (Rossiter et al., 2016).
However, this project, although significant in
local scale was a modest intervention in a re-
gional economy characterised by low-paying
work and below national-average levels of
productivity. Other local labour market inter-
ventions in the D2N2 region reflect prevailing
national policies and a focus on supply-side
interventions that seek to improve skills levels
and move those furthest from the labour market
into entry-level jobs.
Discussion: Differences and
similarities in the two regions?
The evidence presented in developing LEGS in
Greater Manchester and D2N2 and labour
market outcomes provides answers to the re-
search questions posed by this article. The
LEGS pursued by Greater Manchester and the
D2N2 region highlight the tensions that exist
between neoliberal and social democratic at-
tempts to overcome localized economic con-
tradictions in both regions. Greater Manchester
has been able to pursue LEGS that contributes
to buoyant rates of growth because of its his-
torically embedded spatial cohesion, something
that the D2N2 region evidently lacks, based as
it is around two cities. Raw growth figures do
however mask problematic labour market
outcomes in both localities, chiefly problems
associated with low pay, the absence of mid-
level jobs that hinders career progression and
increases in non-standard work and under-
employment. These problems are conse-
quences of the LEGS pursued in both localities,
which in turn are indicative of the structural
power of capital in both localities. Both lo-
calities have experienced the compulsion to
accept and promote the growth of low-paying
service sector work where a failure to do so
could lead to increased unemployment, espe-
cially in the context of a broader political
economy of welfare state retrenchment and
fiscal austerity. Similarly, the growth of low-
paying work in both localities, despite both
rolling out strategies to promote good work,
highlights some of the fundamental limitations
of local labour market interventions.
Evidence illustrates that local state managers
prefer high levels of low-paying jobs, rather
than fewer high-quality jobs and potentially
increased unemployment. Derived as it is from
neoliberalism this LEGS appears successful
despite the wider costs it imposes on labour. For
example, the growth of low-pay, low-
productivity and high-intensity employers has
detrimental consequences for worker health
and well-being that are effectively externalized
beyond the job creation metric of the model that
employers follow. Moreover, employment of
this type has the capacity to crowd-out other
forms of more productive and potentially more
equitable employment as individual private
capital identifies profitable forms of accumu-
lation utilising cheap, low-skilled labour that
have a low turnover time. This approach
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contrasts with investment in potentially more
profitable, more complex forms of accumula-
tion that have a potentially longer turnover time
(Erdem and Glyn, 2001).
Both localities had, prior to the crisis,
service-based economies and each aimed to
increase the quality of their local labour mar-
kets and did so in efforts to grow the amount of
‘good’ employment by promoting particular
sectors. These interventions are however lim-
ited in scale and ambition. All localities aim to
raise their position in global value chains by
increasing levels of high-value added em-
ployment. What is important are the actions
taken to achieve this aim, and whether they are
successful or not. In both Greater Manchester
and D2N2 LEGS are – despite some marginal
promotion of high value-added work – geared
to the promotion of any employment, irre-
spective of quality. There are several reasons
for this; firstly, the logic of local planners is the
aforementioned ‘any job is better than no job’
approach. This logic mirrors central govern-
ment policy, which is advanced by the stick of
work conditionality and punitive benefit
sanctions. Secondly, shifts in government
funding favour local strategies that attempt to
generate jobs in the private sector. Thirdly,
there is the harsh reality that local authorities
simply do not have a great deal of power to
influence substantially the sectoral and occu-
pational composition of localities; LEGS are
limited to shaping activities on the periphery of
local economies and local labour markets. This
fact does not mean LEGS are unimportant;
even slight variations in strategy and policy can
affect people’s working lives and those of their
dependents, leading to increased employment
and rises in average household incomes.
However, shifts in central government policy,
or a fluctuation in the global economy can undo
all of the positive (or detrimental) impacts of
LEGS. One interesting feature of LEGS is the
extent to which localities are attempting to
inculcate resilience against not only the vicis-
situdes of the global political economy, but also
increasingly against the unpredictable but
increasingly detrimental policies of central
government.
The strategies of local planners in both
localities illustrate the contradictions between
neoliberal and social democratic resolutions to
local problems. Neoliberal resolutions involve
favouring open unregulated economic growth,
designed to push the costs of doing business
down through deregulation, and excluding
labour from decision-making. Social demo-
cratic resolutions attempt to coordinate eco-
nomic development, regulate business (which
can incur costs), and include a range of
stakeholders in the decision-making process.
Planners in Greater Manchester – through the
development of local economic governance
institutions and the promotion of clusters –
have pursued some social democratic inter-
ventions. However, the structural power of
capital, both locally and at other spatial scales,
favours neoliberal resolutions to social prob-
lems. The outcome of this approach is local
economic growth continues to take a low-road
path that in the main excludes organised la-
bour from fora such as GMLEP. Planners in
the D2N2 region are attempting to replicate
the ‘Manchester Model’, with less success,
due in part to short period of time the D2N2
region has existed as a defined geographic
entity. Greater Manchester, by contrast, has
been a relatively coherent entity since the
1970s and is undergoing continual processes
of institutional bonding, exemplified by the
creation of the GMCA (Shutt and Liddle,
2019). Relatedly, the GMLEP has been suc-
cessful in part because it mapped onto the
borders of the Greater Manchester city-region.
The longevity of Greater Manchester has al-
lowed it to develop and promote as a brand
globally in a way that is less possible for the
D2N2 region.
Conclusion
This study has answered its research questions
by illustrating how LEGS in Greater Man-
chester and the D2N2 region favour neoliberal
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resolutions to the challenges of economic
growth where both regions are characterised by
the strong influence of individual private cap-
ital. It has also illustrated how LEGS create
problematic labour market outcomes for local
workers in both localities by fostering the
growth of low-paid, poor-quality employment.
This article contributes to the existing knowl-
edge base by articulating how abstract pro-
cesses of capital accumulation are differentially
manifested in localities via LEGS and has
presented theoretical explanations to new em-
pirical data. Future research is necessary to
expand this research agenda, to explore in more
detail the labour market outcomes of LEGS in
more localities, across the United Kingdom and
internationally.
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Note
1. SOC group 1–3 comprises: managers, directors
and senior officials involved in the governance of
large businesses or organisations (group 1),
professional occupations required degree or
postgraduate education (group 2) and associate
professional occupations requiring high-level
vocational qualifications (group 3) (ONS, 2020).
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